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Paying  Refugees  to  Leave  
  
  
This  is  a  penultimate  draft.  When  possible,  please  cite  the  final:    




States  are  increasingly  paying  refugees  to  repatriate,  hoping  to  decrease  the  number  
of  refugees  residing  within  their  borders.  Drawing  on  in-­‐‑depth  interviews  from  East  
Africa,   and   data   from   Israeli   Labour   Statistics,   I   provide   a   description   of   such  
payment  schemes,  and  consider  whether  they  are  morally  permissible.  In  doing  so,  I  
address   two   types   of   cases.   In   the   first   type   of   case,   governments  pay   refugees   to  
repatriate   to   high-­‐‑risk   countries,   never   coercing   them   into   returning.   I   argue   that  
such  payments  are  permissible   if   refugees'ʹ   choices   are  voluntary,   and   states   allow  
refugees  to  return  to  the  host  country  in  the  event  of  an  emergency.  I  then  describe  
cases   where   states   detain   refugees,   and   non-­‐‑governmental   organizations   (NGOs)  
provide  their  own  payments  to  refugees  wishing  to  repatriate.  In  such  cases,  NGOs  
are  only  permitted   to  provide  payments   if   the   funds  are   sufficient   to   ensure  post-­‐‑
return   safety,   and   if   providing   payments   does   not   reinforce   the   government’s  
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This  article  sets  out  to  establish  when,  if  ever,  states  and  organizations  are  morally  
permitted  to  pay  refugees  to  return  to  their  countries  of  origin.  Such  payments  have  
become  increasingly  common  over  the  last  decade.  In  2007  the  Swedish  government  
provided  $7,150  to  families  agreeing  to  repatriate  to  Afghanistan  (UNHCR,  2007).  A  
year   later,   the  Ghanaian  government,  working  with  the  UN,  gave  refugees  $100  to  
return   to   Liberia   (Omata,   2011).   Soon   after,   Denmark   began   offering   $18,700   to  
anyone  returning  to  Iraq,  Iran,  and  Somalia  (The  Telegraph  2009).  In  2010  the  British  
National   Party,   in   an   election   campaign,   promised   to   give   $78,000   to  migrants   or  
refugees  who  agreed  to  leave  the  country.  The  BNP  was  never  elected,  but  in  2011  
the   UK   government   handed   over   $3,500   in   cash   to   families   agreeing   to   return   to  
Zimbabwe   (Weber,   2011).   More   recently,   Australian   Prime   Minster   Tony   Abbott  
proposed   paying   asylum   seekers   $10,000   to   go   back   to   their   countries   of   origin  
(Whyte,  2014)  and  in  2013  the  Israeli  government  began  giving  $3,500  to  thousands  
of  asylum  seekers  who  agreed   to   repatriate.  Those  who  refused   to   repatriate  were  
given  $3,500  to  accept  a  one-­‐‑way  ticket  to  Uganda,  Rwanda,  or  Ethiopia,  where  they  
would  be  unable  to  obtain  any  legal  status.  In  all  six  of  these  cases,  and  many  more  
(Riiskjaer,   2008   and   Black   et   al,   2011),   a   large   proportion   of   those   returning  were  
refugees,  or  owed  protection  on  humanitarian  grounds.  
  
Such  payments  for  repatriation  are  not  new  (Stoessinger  1963,  pp.  68-­‐‑71  and  Barnett  
and  Finnemore,  2004),  but  there  have  been  few  studies  describing  such  policies,  nor  
a   philosophical   analysis   as   to   whether   they   are   ethical.      While   many   scholars  
describe   forced   deportations,   arguing   that   forcing   refugees   to   repatriate   is  wrong  
(Fekete,  2005,  Carens,   ibid;  Gibney,   ibid),  payments  often  involve  no  force,  serving  
as  incentives  alone.  It  is  unclear  when,  if  ever,  such  incentives  are  legitimate.  
  
In   addressing   this   question,   this   article   describes   and   resolves   two   dilemmas  
concerning  payments.   In   the   following  section   I   address  a  “Motivation  Dilemma.”  
When   governments   provide   payments,   we   might   think   the   payments   are   wrong  
	   3	  
because  they  motivate  refugees  to  partake  in  risky  repatriation.  But  though  refugees  
are  motivated  to  take  risks,  perhaps  this  is  not  wrong,  if  their  choice  is  voluntary.  In  
Section   2   I   will   address   a   “Voluntariness   Dilemma.”   In   many   cases,   refugees   or  
migrants   are   forced   into   detention   by   government   authorities.  Non-­‐‑governmental  
organizations  (NGOs),  eager  to  help,  provide  money  to  refugees  and  asylum  seekers  
who   return.   It   is   not   clear   if   NGOs   should   be   providing   such  money,   given   that  
recipients  are  returning  involuntarily.    
  
Before   addressing   these   dilemmas,   a   number   of   clarifications.   The   refugees   under  
consideration   are   primarily   those   whom   the   UN   claims   should   not   be   forcibly  
returned,  but   instead  given  asylum  or   the  opportunity   to  apply   for   refugee  status.  
These   are   individuals   whose   lives   will   likely   be   at   risk   from   persecution   if   they  
return   (1951   Convention   and   1967   Protocol).   I   will   assume   that   individuals   who  
have   fled  persecution  should  only  be   forced   to   repatriate   if,   at   the  very   least,   they  
can  return  to  safety  and  as  equal  citizens  in  their  countries  of  origin,  able  to  obtain  
restitution  of  lost  property,  and  compensation  for  past  wrongs  (Long,  2013:  162  and  
Bradley,   2014).   I   focus   on   those   refugees   who   cannot   obtain   such   rights   in   their  
home  countries,  and  so  who  should  not  be  forcibly  repatriated.      
  
Though   I   mostly   focus   on   refugees   fleeing   persecution,   I   will   at   times   discuss  
individuals  fleeing  general  violence  and  food  insecurity.  I  assume  that  coercing  such  
“survival  migrants”  (Betts,  2010)  to  leave  is  unethical  if  the  state  has  the  capacity  to  
accept   such   individuals   without   incurring   great   costs,   and   if   accepting   these  
migrants  is  the  only  way  to  ensure  that  they  obtain  basic  human  rights.  This  claim  is  
supported   not   only   by   philosophers  who   believe   in   open   borders,   such   as   Joseph  
Carens  (ibid)  but  also  by  those  who  defend  states’  right  to  exclude  immigrants,  such  
as   David   Miller   (ibid),   Matthew   Gibney   (ibid),   and   even   some   states   themselves  
(Betts   ibid).   As   such,   it   serves   as   a   “minimal   ethical   standard”   (Hidalgo,   ibid)   to  
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determine  who   states   should   not   deport,   leaving   open   the   question   of  who   states  
should  pay  to  leave.    
  
Though   I  make   the   above   assumptions,   one  may   accept   the   general   conclusions   I  
reach,  while  still  disagreeing  on  who  deserves  asylum.  My  goal   is  not   to  settle   the  
debate  about  whom  states  should  protect,  but  to  resolve  the  puzzle  of  who  should  
be  paid  to  leave,  if  there  is  a  consensus  that  protection  is  warranted.    
  
I   focus  on  monetary   incentives   throughout   this   article.  The  UN  has   also  provided  
food,  soap,  and  shelter  to  encourage  repatriation  (Turton  and  Marsden,  2002,  p.  27).  
I   put   such   cases   aside   because   there   is   far   less   evidence   that   non-­‐‑monetary  
assistance   actually   encourages   repatriation.   Nonetheless,   if   there   is   evidence   that  
such   assistance   encourages   return   in   a   similar   manner   to   money,   then   similar  
dilemmas  arise,  requiring  similar  solutions  to  those  I  pose.    
  
Throughout   the   article,   I   shall   raise   examples   of   repatriation   from   a   number   of  
countries.  However,   I   provide   far  more   in-­‐‑depth  descriptions   of   repatriation   from  
Israel.   This   is   partly   because   the   country   has   publicized   detailed   statistics   on   the  
number   who   have   returned,   the   extent   of   detention,   and   the   amount   of   money  
provided  to  individuals  returning.  Such  details  are  useful  for  drawing  inferences  on  
how   money   may   motivate   return,   and   how   detention   may   impact   refugees’  
decisions  to  accept  payments  for  return.  Furthermore,  due  to  my  ties  to  the  refugee  
community   in   Israel,   I   was   able   to   conduct   extensive   research   on   their   return,  
spending  a  total  of  half  a  year  in  South  Sudan,  Uganda,  and  Ethiopia,  interviewing  
126  former  refugees  who  had  returned  from  Israel.1  and  an  additional  29  interviews  
with   individuals   who   returned,   or   were   about   to   return,   to   other   countries   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  I   first   contacted   three   individuals   whose   phone   numbers   were   provided   to   me   by   NGOs   who  
facilitated  return.  I  then  interviewed  these  returnees  and  their  acquaintances,  until  exhausting  all  links.  
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origin.2  These   interviews   provided   valuable   qualitative   data   on   the   process   of  
payments  themselves,  not  available  in  current  literature.    
  
Though  I  present  original  data  on  Israel,  I  shall  demonstrate  that  the  case  of  Israel  is  
not   entirely   different   from   other   repatriation   programs,   and   raises   similar   ethical  
dilemmas   to   those   found   in   other   countries.   From   these   dilemmas   I   develop   a  
general  theory  of  how  governments  may  develop  a  more  ethical  payment  policy.  
  
1.  Motivation  Dilemma  
Motivation  Dilemmas  occur  when  states  offer  refugees  full  protection,  and  motivate  
them   to   decline   this   protection,   providing   money   on   the   condition   that   they  
repatriate.  It  is  unclear  if  states  are  ethically  permitted  to  provide  such  payments.    
  
Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of  Gatlauk,  who  fled  southern  Sudan  as  a  young  boy  
during  the  Second  Sudanese  Civil  War  in  the  1980s.  As  an  adult  he  eventually  took  a  
boat   to   Egypt   and   crossed   into   Israel   with   the   help   of   smugglers.   In   Israel   the  
government   never   assessed   his   claim   that   he   was   a   refugee,   but   provided   a  
temporary   visa   as   part   of   general   protection   granted   to   all   southern   Sudanese  
refugees.  He  was  satisfied  with  his   life   in  Israel,  as  he  was  free   to  work   in  a  hotel,  
experiencing   no   coercive   pressure   to   leave.   When   South   Sudan   became   an  
independent   country   in   2011   Gatluak   still   feared   returning   due   to   his   ethnic  
identity,  and  because  he  lacked  family  networks  to  ensure  basic  food  security  after  
returning.  He   changed   his  mind   in   2012,   returning  when   the  Ministry   of   Interior  
told  him  he  could  receive  $1,500  for  his  repatriation.  Upon  arriving  in  Juba,  he  spent  
the  money  on  apartment  rent  and  food,  but  failed  to  find  a   job.  Within  six  months  
his  money  ran  out,  and  he  began  living  on  a  concrete  patio  outside  a  police  station  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  These  included  twelve  individuals  interviewed  in  Thailand  after  return,  four  in  Ethiopia,  one  in  the  
Philippines,   two   in   Guinea,   and   three   in   Nigeria.   Those   I   interviewed   before   return   included   two  
individuals   from   Togo,   a   woman   from   Ethiopia,   a   woman   from   the   Philippines,   and   three   family  
members  planning  on  returning  to  Colombia.  
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in   Juba,  without   shelter,   savings,   job   skills,   family,   or   daily  meals.  When   I   visited  
him  that  year,  strangers  were  providing  him  limited  food,  medicine,  and  water.  He  
did  not  know  how  long  their  charity  would  last,  and  had  no  access  to  state  services  
(Interview  with  Gatluak,  15  March  2012).  I  was  unable  to  reach  him  when  the  South  
Sudanese  Civil  War  broke  out   in  2013.  Based  on  my   interviews  with  other   former  
refugees  who  returned,  he  was  likely  displaced,  and  possibly  killed.    
  
We   might   suppose   that,   in   Gatluak’s   case,   the   Israeli   government   did   not   truly  
provide  him  protection,  because  they  merely  let  him  work,  without  providing  him  
official   residency   or   the   right   to   apply   for   asylum.   We   might   also   suppose   that,  
when   asylum   seekers   cannot   apply   for   asylum,   we   cannot   be   certain   they   are  
genuine   refugees,   because   their   individual   claims   are   never   assessed.   But  
Motivation  Dilemmas  also  arise  in  cases  where  states  do  assess  all  claims,  providing  
both   residency   status   and   money   to   encourage   return.   In   the   1990s   Australia  
recognized  thousands  of  Afghan  asylum  seekers  as  refugees,  providing  them  access  
to   social   services,  work  visas,   and  healthcare,   later  offering   each   family   $10,000   to  
repatriate  in  2002.  3,400  refugees  chose  to  return,  their  fate  never  monitored  by  the  
government,   but   likely   leading   to   the   deaths   of   at   least   some   of   these   refugees  
(Mansouri  and  Wood,  2006,  p.  9).  In  the  1990s  the  German  government  assessed  the  
claims  of  all  Bosnian  asylum  seekers,  and  recognized  them  as  refugees,   later  using  
monetary   incentives   to  motivate   them   to   repatriate   to   a   country  where   they   faced  
extreme   poverty   and   discrimination   (von   Lersner   et   al,   2008).   Sweden,   when  
providing  payments   to  Afghan   refugees,   similarly   assessed   their   claims,   provided  
both  refugee  status  and  money  to  repatriate  (UNHCR,  2007).    
  
The   UN’s   official   position   is   that   such   payments   can   be   legitimate   if   there   is  
evidence   that   conditions   have   substantially   improved   in   refugees’   countries   of  
origin,  such  that  returnees’  lives  will  not  be  at  risk  (UNHCR,  1996).  The  UN  will  also  
endorse   cash  payments  when,   though   conditions   remain  unsafe,   there   is   evidence  
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that  conditions  are   improving,  and  refugees’  status  will   soon  be  revoked,  as  when  
the  UN  provided  $100  to  Liberian  refugees  repatriating  from  Ghana  in  2008  (Omata,  
2011,  pp.  1  and  14).  It  is  not  clear  if  such  payments  are  truly  ethical,  nor  is  it  clear  if  
payments   are   ethical   when   return   is   clearly   unsafe   and   will   remain   unsafe,   and  
governments  use  no  coercion,  providing  monetary  incentives  alone.    
  
Before   considering   the   ethics   of   such   policies,   it   is   worth   establishing   if   there   is  
empirical   evidence   that   money   really   does   motivate   return.   In   the   cases   noted,  
refugees   may   be   responding   only   to   fear   of   future   detention,   or   a   belief   that  
conditions  have  improved  in  their  countries  of  origin.    
  
Data  from  Israeli  labour  statistics  provides  limited  evidence  that  money  was,  at  the  
very   least,   strongly  correlated  with  decisions   to   return,   even  when  detention   rates  
were  relatively  low,  and  conditions  in  countries  of  origin  remained  the  same.  In  the  
months   that   refugees   were   paid   more   money   to   leave,   more   refugees   agreed   to  
return,   even   when   the   detention   rates   were   the   same   as   in   other   months,   and  
conditions  in  countries  of  origin  remained  the  same.3  For  example,  in  October  2013,  
the   government   paid   all   asylum   seekers   $1,500   if   they   left   the   country,   and   also  
began  detaining  asylum  seekers.  180  left.  While  the  number  dropped  in  November,  
when  the  High  Court  of   Justice  ordered  that  asylum  seekers  be  released,	   	  from  the  
beginning  of  December   the  government  passed  new   legislation   to  detain   refugees,  
and   also   increased   the   grant   money   to   $3,500,   such   that   detention   policies   were  
similar   to  October,  but   the  payments  greater.  295  returned   in  December  compared  
to  October’s  180,  a  significant  increase.	    
  
There  was  also  evidence  that  the  government  provided  money  for  return  precisely  
when  detaining  refugees  became  legally  difficult.  In  March  2013,  the  UN  and  Israeli  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Appendix	  at	  
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I2uNJ4x3_h8SHRc5Oc64mNUWMijkyvbbYSwVlPERmiM/ed
it?usp=sharing	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High  Court  of  Justice  pressured  the  government  to  stop  detaining  refugees  and,  that  
same  month,  the  government  increased  the  payments  from  $100  to  $1,500.  Between  
March  and  August  2013  the  government  found  other  ways  to  detain  refugees,  using  
a  series  of  by-­‐‑laws  to  circumvent  the  court’s  instructions,  and  it  also  never  raised  the  
payments.  The  High  Court  ordered  the  end  of  these  by-­‐‑laws  in  September,  requiring  
the   government   to   once   again   release   refugees,   and   the   government   soon   began  
talks   to   increase   the   payments   again.   When   the   government   stalled   and   never  
actually   released   any   refugees,   the   High   Court   forced   the   government   to   release  
refugees   in   October,   and   the   Prime   Minister   rapidly   approved   an   increase   in  
payments  from  $1,500  to  $5,000  (Lior  2013).    
  
The  above  does  not  prove  that  money  motivated  return,  as  other  unknown  variables  
–   such   as   the   rate   of  policing,   or   refugees’   subjective  preferences   –  may  have   also  
changed  during  these  months,  explaining  the  variation  in  return  rates.  Nonetheless,  
the  data  we  do  have  provides  evidence  that  money  may  have  motivated  return,  and  
was   intended   to   motivate   return.      Similar   evidence   can   be   found   in   studies   on  
repatriation   from   Pakistan   to   Afghanistan   (Davin   et   al,   2009);   from   Tanzania   to  
Burundi  (Haver  et  al,  2009,  p.  6);  and  from  the  UK  to  Zimbabwe  (Webber,  ibid).    
  
If   money   does   motivate   return,   and   is   intended   to,   is   it   ethically   permitted?   To  
answer   this   question,   we   might   first   determine   whether,   when   refugees   accept  
money  to  return,  their  choice  is  truly  voluntary.    To  consider  this,  we  must  establish  
what  we  mean,  precisely,  when  we  claim  a  choice  is  voluntary.    
  
In  general,  there  is  a  broad  consensus  that  three  criteria  must  be  met  for  a  choice  to  
be   voluntary.   Individuals   must   be   fully   informed   and   with   full   capacity   when  
making  a  decision  (Wertheimer  and  Miller  2008);  they  mustn’t  be  physically  coerced  
into   their   decision   (Nozick,   1974;   Long,   2013);   and   they   must   have   at   least   one  
option   that   ensures   an   acceptable   level   of   welfare   (Valdman,   2009,   Wolff   and  
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DeShalit,   2007,   p.   78;   Olsaretti   2004,   p.   139).   For   an   example   where   the   third  
condition   is  not  met,   consider  a   starving   individual  who  accepts   a   job   that  pays  a  
piece  of  bread  a  day.  Her  choice   is   involuntary,  as  both  working  and  not  working  
fall  below  an  acceptable  threshold  of  welfare  (Long,  2013).4    
  
Though  choices  are  involuntary  when  all  options  fall  below  an  acceptable  threshold  
of  welfare,  I  assume  that  a  single  option  can  be  voluntary  even  if  it  is  the  only  option  
with  acceptable  welfare.  If  a  person  is  living  in  poverty,  and  the  only  option  to  leave  
this   poverty   is   to   accept   a   well-­‐‑paying   job,   her   choice   to   accept   this   job   seems  
voluntary   (Long   2013,   pp.   162-­‐‑163).   Following   this   reasoning,   a   choice   is   also  
voluntary   if  one   leaves  behind  a   life  with  an  acceptably  high   level  of  welfare,  and  
chooses   a   life  without   an   acceptable   level   of  welfare,   such   as   a  woman  quitting   a  
pleasant   and   well-­‐‑paying   job   to   live   a   life   of   extreme   poverty.   Her   choice   is  
voluntary  because  she  has  at  least  one  acceptable  option.  
  
Based  in  the  above  criteria  for  voluntariness,  refugees  can  voluntarily  accept  money  
and   repatriate   if   they   are   fully   informed   about   the   risks   of   repatriating,   have   full  
capacity,   face  no  physical  coercion,  and  are  returning  from  a  host  country  with  an  
acceptable   level   of  welfare.  Acceptable  welfare,   I   assume,   includes   sufficient   food,  
shelter,   education,   and   other   basic   rights.   If   Gatluak   knew   about   the   risks   of  
returning,   then   his   return   was   arguably   voluntary,   as   he   had   access   to   sufficient  
employment  and  medical  care  in  Israel,  even  if  such  necessities  were  not  available  in  
South  Sudan.  Similar  voluntariness   can  be   found  amongst   refugees  paid   to   return  
from   Germany   to   Bosnia   in   the   1990,   and   from   Australia   and   Sweden   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Some	  might	  disagree	  with	  this	  claim,	  raising	  the	  following	  counter-­‐example:	  There	  are	  many	  individuals	  living	  
in	   extreme	   poverty	   their	   whole	   lives,	   such	   that	   all	   options	   in	   their	   lives	   involve	   unacceptably	   low	   levels	   of	  
welfare.	  It	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  claim	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  making	  any	  voluntary	  choices.	  To	  address	  such	  counter-­‐
examples,	   it	   might	   be	   accurate	   to	   view	   voluntariness	   as	   a	   range	   property,	   rather	   than	   a	   binary	   property.	   A	  
choice	   is	   less	   voluntary,	   rather	   than	   completely	   involuntary,	   when	   every	   option	   falls	   below	   an	   unacceptable	  
threshold	  of	  welfare.	  Though	  voluntariness	  is	  a	  range	  property,	  I	  assume	  that	  a	  very	  low	  level	  of	  voluntariness	  is	  
a	  state	  of	  affairs	  we	  ought	  to	  prevent,	  by	  improving	  the	  options	  individuals	  have.	  For	  simplicity,	  therefore,	  I	  will	  
call	  choices	  “involuntary”	  when	  they	  involve	  instances	  where	  all	  choices	  involve	  low	  levels	  of	  welfare.	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Afghanistan  in  2002  and  2007.    If  a  refugee  lacks  acceptable  conditions  in  their  host  
country,   their  return  may  still  be  voluntary   if   they  are  returning  to  a  country  with  
acceptable   conditions.   Just  as  an   impoverished   individual   can  voluntarily  accept  a  
job,  if  the  job  involves  an  acceptable  level  of  welfare,  a  refugee  living  in  destitution  
can  voluntarily  repatriate,  if  repatriation  involves  an  acceptable  level  of  welfare.    
  
This  would  imply  that  a  refugee   living  in  destitution  could  voluntary  repatriate   if,  
though  conditions  remain  unsafe   in   their  country  of  origin,   they  are  given  enough  
money   to   ensure   an   acceptable   level   of   welfare.   We   might   imagine   a   refugee  
returning   with   her   family   to   a   country   with   widespread   persecution,   and   each  
family  member   receiving   $78,000   as   promised   by   the   BNP.      Perhaps   such   funds,  
totalling  almost  half  a  million  dollars,  could  pay  for  housing,  food,  private  security,  
and  evacuation  services   in   the  event  of  persecution.   In  such  a  scenario,   the  money  
would   produce   an   option   with   a   sufficiently   high   level   of   welfare,   creating   a  
voluntary  return.    
  
Therefore,   the   minimal   conditions   for   voluntariness   can   be   met   with   payment  
schemes.   But   even   if   returns   are   voluntary,   there   is   another   reason   to   believe   the  
payments  are  morally  impermissible.    
  
In   general,   offers   can   be  wrong   if   they  demean   and   objectify   the   recipients   of   the  
offers   (Satz,   2010;   Phillips,   2010;   Sandel,   2012).   When   governments   directly   pay  
refugees   to   repatriate,   they   treat   refugees   as   unwanted   individuals   whose   exit   is  
worth  whatever  money  the  government  is  willing  to  pay  them.  The  government  is  
essentially   telling   refugees,   “We  do  not  want  you   so  much,   that  we  are  willing   to  
sacrifice  money  so  that  you  repatriate.”  The  greater  the  money  offered,  the  stronger  
this   message.   For   this   reason,   the   British   Nationalist   Party   –   a   fringe   party   and  
openly  xenophobic  –  was  willing  to  spend  $78,000  for  each  asylum  seeker  or  refugee  
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who   returned.   Refugees   have   no   alternative   but   to   be   exposed   to   this   demeaning  
treatment,  whether  they  accept  the  money  or  not.    
  
Though   payments   to   leave   are   demeaning,   and   may   reinforce   stereotypes   about  
refugees,   I   believe   this   does   not   provide   a   decisive   reason   against   payments.  
Refugees   can   turn   down   the   offer,   and   send   a   strong   counter-­‐‑message   back:   “We  
want  to  stay  so  much  that  we  are  willing  to  reject  your  money  in  order  to  stay.”  The  
greater   the   money   offered,   the   stronger   this   counter-­‐‑message,   strengthening   the  
expressed   commitment   of   refugees   to   remain,   publicizing   how   dangerous   it   is   to  
leave.  And,   in  many   cases,   there  may   be   no   demeaning  message.   If   the  money   is  
provided   as   a   form   of   assistance,   rather   than   an   incentive,   there   needn’t   be   any  
perceived  offence,  even  if  one  purpose  of  the  money  is  to  encourage  return.    
  
There   is   a   second,   stronger   reason   payments   are   unethical.      In   general,   offers   are  
unethical  if  they  involve  great  physical  harm.  If  I  agree  to  lend  you  money,  and  you  
agree  to  give  up  your  right  hand  if  you  do  not  pay  me  back,  no  judge  should  uphold  
the   agreement.   In   contract   law,   such   “unconscionable   contracts”   are   not   upheld  
partly  because  it  is  wrong  for  the  state  to  encourage  or  endorse  self-­‐‑harm,  given  that  
states  were   created   partly   to   protect   citizens,   residents,   and   refugees  within   their  
territories.  Were   the  government   to   encourage   self-­‐‑harming  activity,   it  would  also  
be  forcing  citizens  to  support  such  contracts,  as  it  is  citizens  who  pay  taxes  into  the  
judicial  system  that  supports  the  contracts  (Shiffrin,  2000).      
  
Self-­‐‑harming   contracts   are   also   involuntary   in   one   sense.   As   noted   above,   for   an  
agent  to  make  a  voluntary  choice,  they  must  have  sufficient  capacity  to  understand  
the   implication  of   the  choice.  When  an   individual  accepts  money  on   the  condition  
that   they   experience   possible   harm   in   the   future,   they   may   lack   the   capacity   to  
weigh   the   future   costs   of   their   current   actions.   This   is   partly   because   it   may   be  
difficult   to   imagine   what   it   will   feel   like   to   experience   a   painful   outcome   in   the  
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future,  but  also  because  of  the  general  psychological  tendency  to  discount  the  future  
harms  for  one’s  current  gains  (Shane  et  al,  2002).  Even  if  an  individual  does  have  the  
capacity   to   comprehend   future   harm,   there   may   be   certain   rights   that   are  
inalienable,  and  that  we  have  no  right  to  sell   to  others.  Just  as  we  should  never  be  
permitted   to   sell   ourselves   into   slavery,  we   should  never  be  permitted   to   sacrifice  
basic  necessities  for  money  (Sandel,  ibid,  Freeman,  2011;  Satz,  ibid).    
  
Payments   to   repatriate   are   types  of   “unconscionable   contracts.”   In   Israel,   refugees  
arrived  at  the  office  of  a  civil  servant,  signed  on  a  dotted  line,  received  $3,500  in  an  
envelope,  and   their   legal   status  was   revoked   the  moment   they  boarded  a   flight.   If  
they   faced   danger   in   their   home   countries,   and   attempted   to   re-­‐‑enter   Israel,   they  
would   be   deported,   because   they   had   earlier   received  money   to   forgo   any   future  
protection   (Interview   with   Voluntary   Return   official,   Tel   Aviv,   7   August   2013).  
Throughout   this  process,   refugees  were   encouraged   to   risk   their   lives,   rather   than  
continue  to  accept  protection,  and  the  public  was  forced  to  pay  taxes  into  a  system  
that  enforced  this  contract  with  detrimental  consequences.    
  
We  might  claim  that,  in  the  case  of  Israel,  it  was  not  payments  that  were  wrong,  but  
the  enforcement  of  the  agreement.  If  refugees  who  tried  to  re-­‐‑enter  Israeli  territory  
were  deported,   then   this  was  a   form  of   refoulement,   the   illegal   forced  removal  of  a  
refugee   according   to   international   law.   The   problem   was   not   the   payments,   we  
might  contend,  but  the  wrongful  rejection  of  genuine  refugee  claims.  However,  even  
in   cases   where   refugees   are   merely   paid   to   repatriate,   but   not   blocked   from   re-­‐‑
entering,   they   may   still   face   immediate   danger   after   returning,   and   be   unable   to  
apply   for   a   visa,   fly   back   to   the   safe   country,   and   again   apply   for   refugee   status.  
When  civil  war  broke  out  in  South  Sudan,  almost  half  of  my  respondents  fled  to  an  
IDP   camp,   and   could   not   leave   the   camp   safely   because   of   their   Nuer   ethnic  
identity.  They  also  lacked  money  to  pay  for  a  private  vehicle  to  pick  them  up,  take  
them   swiftly   to   the   airport,   and   flee   the   country   by   air.      If   the   risks   of   return   are  
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significant,  then  the  government  is  still  encouraging  self-­‐‑harming  activity,  even  if  it  
is  merely  paying  for  repatriation,  rather  than  blocking  refugees  from  re-­‐‑entering  the  
state’s  territory.    
  
The   above   reasoning   suggests   that   payments   may   be   ethically   permissible   if  
individuals  can  safely  repatriate,  either  because  they  are  returning  to  countries  that  
are  safe,  or  because  they  are  given  a  substantial  amount  of  money  to  pay  for  private  
security,   healthcare,   and   other   necessitates.   If   the   return   is   sufficiently   safe,   these  
refugees  and  asylum  seekers  would  not  be  entering  an  unconscionable  contract.    
  
Even  if  an  individual  is  returning  to  an  unsafe  country,  payments  could  possibly  be  
ethical   if   returnees   have   practical   and   legal  mechanisms   to   later   re-­‐‑enter   the   host  
country  if  they  find  themselves  again  in  danger.  We  might  imagine  a  policy  where  
the   state   paid   refugees   to   leave,   but   also   provided   re-­‐‑entry   visas   and   evacuation  
services   back   to   the   former   host   state   in   the   event   of   a   crisis.   The   risks   to   return  
would  be  substantially  mitigated,  and  so  payments  possibly  ethical.  A  close  version  
of   this   policy   was   implemented   in   the   1990s,   when   the   governments   of   Sweden,  
France   and   the   United   Kingdom   provided   funds   to   Bosnian   refugees   to   travel   to  
Bosnia,   where   they   could   easily   re-­‐‑enter   these   states'ʹ   territories   if   they   were  
unhappy   with   their   return   (Black,   2001).   On   a   more   limited   scale,   UNHCR  
organized  “go-­‐‑and-­‐‑see”  visits  for  Burundian  refugees  in  Tanzania,  providing  them  
payments   to   repatriate,   along  with   transport   to   again   re-­‐‑enter  Tanzania   (UNHCR,  
2004).     Many  of   these  programs  do  not  allow  refugees   to   change   their  mind  more  
than  once:  They  can  repatriate,  re-­‐‑enter  the  host  country  once,  and  if  they  repatriate  
a   second   time   they   are   not   offered   funds   and   a   visa   to   again   re-­‐‑enter   the   host  
country   (Carr,   2014;   Koser,   2001).   Nonetheless,   we   might   envision   a   payment  
scheme  involving  both  the  ability  to  exit  and  enter  the  host  country  indefinitely,  and  
the   ability   to   access   emergency   evacuations   if   necessary.   Payments  would  merely  
incentivize  return,  without  significantly  sacrificing  refugees’  safety.  
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2.  Voluntariness  Dilemma      
While   Motivation   Dilemmas   address   cases   where   refugees   are   not   coerced   into  
returning,  Voluntariness  Dilemmas  occur  when  states  detain  refugees  or  deny  them  
basic  necessities,   telling  them  deportation   is  a  possibility.  NGOs  and  UN  agencies,  
eager  to  help,  provide  their  own  funds  to  those  agreeing  to  return.  In  such  cases,  if  
the  money  is   insufficient  to  ensure  a  safe  return,   then  refugees  have  no  reasonable  
options,   given   that   staying   involves   detention,   and   repatriation   involves  
unacceptable   risks.   If   refugees   have   no   reasonable   options,   their   return   is  
involuntary.  But  though  the  choice  is  involuntary,  perhaps  it  is  better  to  encourage  
return   via   repatriation   than   for   refugees   to   remain   in   detention,   possibly   facing   a  
completely  forced,  violent,  and  traumatic  deportation.  
  
This   dilemma   focuses   not   on  what   governments   ought   to   do,   but   on  what  NGOs  
and   the   UN   ought   to   do   when   governments   fail   to   live   up   to   their   duties   of  
providing   protection   to   refugees.   The   Voluntariness   Dilemma   was   especially  
common  in  Israel,  where  the  government  vowed  to  detain  the  majority  of  Eritrean  
and  Sudanese   asylum  seekers,   including   the   refugees   amongst   them.     At   first,   the  
government  was  the  only  body  to  provide  funds  to  refugees  in  detention,  and  most  
NGOs   refused   to   cooperate,   fearing   that   refugees   were   accepting   funds   to   avoid  
detention,   rather   than   because   they   truly   wished   to   return.   NGOs’   fears   were  
consistent  with  Labour  Statistics,  which  demonstrated  that  rates  of  return  increased  
when   detention   increased,   and   decreased   when   detention   decreased,   even   when  
government  payments   to   leave   stayed   the   same.5  For  example,   in  August  2013   the  
government  passed  a  new  “Anti-­‐‑Infiltration  Law”  allowing  the  Ministry  of  Interior  
to   arrest   refugees   and   detain   them,   and   170   returned.   When   the   High   Court   of  
Justice   nullified   the   law   in   September,   only   89   returned,   even   though   payments  
remained  the  same.  When  no  one  was  actually  released  in  the  beginning  of  October  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  Appendix	  at	  
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I2uNJ4x3_h8SHRc5Oc64mNUWMijkyvbbYSwVlPERmiM/edit?usp
=sharing	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2013,   the  number  of  returns   increased  again,   from  89   to  180,  even  while  payments  
remained  the  same  as  in  September.  If  detention  was  a  motivation  for  return,  NGOs  
wanted  nothing  to  do  with  payment  schemes.  
  
As   the   Israeli   government   seemed   unwilling   to   change   its   policies,   some   NGOs  
eventually   began   offering   their   own   payments   of   800   Euro   each,   feeling   this  was  
preferable   for   especially   vulnerable   refugees   facing   detention.   One   of   the   first  
refugees   to   receive   such   funds   was   Tigisti,   her   husband   Hewan,   and   their   two  
children.   All   were   included   in   the   38,000   individuals   whom   UNHCR   considered  
likely   refugees   (UNHCR,   2015),   despite   the   Israeli   government   denying   them   this  
status.   Though  UN   officials  were   attempting   and   resettle   some   refugees   to  North  
America   and   Europe,   Tigisti   did   not   know   if   she   would   be   included   in   this  
resettlement   scheme.  When   her   husband  was   subject   to   detention,  NGOs   tried   to  
petition  for  his  release,  but  failed.  Instead,  they  offered  to  pay  the  family  3,200  Euro  
to   repatriate.   After   returning   they   were   forced   to   flee   to   Ethiopia   where   they  
obtained  asylum  seeker  status,  but  no  work  visas  to  support  themselves  (Interview  
with  Tigisti,  Addis  Ababa,  12  June  2014).  
  
Similar  cases  of  coerced  returns  occurred  in  Tanzania  when,  in  the  mid-­‐‑2000s,  anti-­‐‑
refugee   sentiment   increased,   prompting   the   government   to   confine   refugees   to  
camps,   denying   them   the   option   of   working   in   urban   areas,   forcing   many   into  
detention-­‐‑like  conditions.  The  UN,  hoping  to  help  alleviate  these  conditions,  offered  
refugees   funds   to   repatriate,   even  as   evidence  grew   that   they  would  unlikely   find  
food  security  in  Burundi  with  the  money  offered  (Haver  et  al,  ibid).  More  recently,  
the  government  of  Pakistan  has  announced  it  would  soon  revoke  the  refugee  status  
of  millions  of  Afghan  nationals.  The  UN  has  responded  by  providing  $400  to  those  
agreeing   to   repatriate   (The  Economist   2016).   In   these  and   similar   cases,   it   remains  
unclear  if  the  UN  should  provide  funds.  
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The  dilemma  becomes  more   complex  when  we   consider   cases   of   individuals  who  
are   asylum   seekers,   and   yet   to   prove   to   the   UN   or   governments   that   they   are  
refugees.  Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of  Solomon.  In  the  1980s  the  government  
of  Ethiopia  confiscated  his  ancestral  land,  forcing  him  to  migrate  to  Sudan,  where  he  
found   employment   and   married,   but   faced   harassment   from   authorities.   He  
eventually  moved  with  his  wife  to  Egypt,  where  they  found  work  and  gave  birth  to  
their  daughter,  but   faced  similar  harassment   from  authorities,  deciding  eventually  
to  pay  smugglers  to  take  them  into  Israel  in  2006.  Once  there,  they  failed  to  obtain  
legal   residency,   but   found   illegal   employment   in   a   hotel,   and   a   school   for   their  
daughter.   Six   years   later,   in   2012,   Solomon'ʹs   wife   left   him,   and   he   raised   his  
daughter   on   his   own   for   several  months.  When   anti-­‐‑immigration   protests   spread  
throughout   the   country,   he  was   soon   detained,   and   his   daughter   placed   in   foster  
care.  Government  officials  pressured  him  to  return,   telling  him  they  could  pay   for  
his   flight   to  Ethiopia,  and  that  he  would  eventually  be  deported   if  he  declined  the  
offer.  He  refused  for  over  a  year,  demanding  that  he  have  access  to  a  Refugee  Status  
Determination   process.   The   government   refused,   and   he   finally   agreed   to   return  
when  an  NGO  offered  him  800  Euro  for  his  repatriation,  sponsored  by  the  European  
Refugee  Fund.  He  returned  with  his  daughter  in  2013.  By  2014  he  failed  to  obtain  his  
ancestral  land,  and  lacked  medical  care,  food  security  and  reliable  shelter  (Interview  
with  Solomon,  Addis  Ababa,  10  June  2014).    
  
We   might   at   first   suppose   that,   in   the   case   of   both   Tigisti   and   Solomon,   NGOs  
should  not  have  provided  money  for  return.  Tigisti  and  her  family  were  faced  with  
only  two  unreasonable  options,  and  so  their  choice  was  involuntary.  If  their  choice  
was   involuntary,   then   they   were   victims   of   refoulement,   the   wrongful   forcing   of  
refugees   back   to   their   countries   of   origin.   Solomon  was   not   necessarily   a   refugee,  
but  he  was  denied   the   right   to   apply   for   refugee   status,   and  wrongfully   forced   to  
return  before  given  this  right.    
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In   response   to   the   above   reasoning,  NGOs  might   defend   their   payments  with   the  
following   three   arguments.      First,   it   is   not   wrong   to   help   a   person   with   an  
involuntary  choice,  if  there  is  no  other  possible  choice  to  provide  them.  If  I  am  shot  
by   a   sniper,   and   then   run   to   the  hospital,   I   can   give   valid   consent   to   a  doctor   for  
surgery,  even  if  my  options  are  between  dying  and  risky  treatment.  Refugees  may  
be   capable   of   giving   valid   consent   to   accepting  NGOs’   assistance   to   return,   even  
though   they   are   coerced   into   returning   by   the   government.   So   long   as   NGOs  
themselves   use   no   coercion,   and   can  do   little   else   to   help,   they  do  no  wrong.     Of  
course,   NGOs   should   also   work   hard   to   end   coercive   background   conditions  
(Barnett,  2011  and  Gerver  forthcoming).  But  if  NGOs  do  everything  in  their  power  
to  stop  detention  policies  and  fail,  refugees’  consent  to  return  may  be  valid  from  the  
perspective   of   NGOs.   Similarly,   in   cases   where   refugees   and   asylum   seekers   are  
denied   access   to   food   and   shelter,   NGOs   act   rightly  when   they   provide   funds   to  
repatriate,   if   there   is   nothing   else   the  NGOs   can  do   to   help.   Though   recipients   of  
money   are   involuntarily   accepting   the   offer,   because   they   have   no   reasonable  
options,   it   would   be   even  more   involuntary   for   refugees   to   lack   the   resources   to  
return.   This   reasoning   has   been   expressed   by   the   UN,   which   states   that,   though  
NGOs  should  try  and  assist  refugees  to  obtain  their  legal  rights,  if  this  fails,  assisting  
with  return  may  be  ethical  if  the  “life  or  physical  integrity  of  refugees  in  the  country  
of  asylum  is  threatened”  (UNHCR,  2002,  p.  7).  
  
The  above  argument,  however,   is  not  quite  enough  to   justify   the  payments.  NGOs  
could   simply   make   return   possible,   but   avoid   actively   encouraging   return   by  
offering   thousands   of   dollars   to   do   so.      Money   may   merely   encourage   unsafe  
repatriation,   and   is   comparable   to   the   unconscionable   contracts   described   in   the  
previous   section.   If   refugees   are   only   willing   to   risk   repatriation   in   return   for  
money,  and  repatriation  is  riskier  than  staying,  then  NGOs  ought  not  to  encourage  
such  repatriation,  even  if  making  return  possible  is  justified.    
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NGOs   may   present   a   second   argument   in   favour   of   their   payments:   providing  
money  to  return  enhances  refugees’  choices  compared  to  no  money  at  all.  Consider  
the   case   of   Bessie  who,   in   2009,   fled   an  East  African   country,  went   to  Egypt,   and  
paid   smugglers   who   promised   to   take   her   to   Israel.   As   they   began   their   journey  
across   the   Sinai,   she   was   kidnapped   and   tortured,   but  managed   to   flee   to   Israel,  
where   she   was   given   a   year   of   residency,   and   a   room   at   a   centre   for   victims   of  
human  trafficking.  She  wished  to  return  to  her  country  of  origin  and  start  a  chicken  
farm,  a  choice  made  possible  when  she  received  800  euro  from  an  NGO.  Soon  after  
returning,   the   chickens   she   bought   died,   she   lost   her   life   savings,   and   she   now  
works  in  a  restaurant  with  just  enough  to  live  on.  She  faces  regular  food  insecurity,  
but   is   nonetheless   happy   she   had   the   opportunity   to   leave   Israel   with   money,   a  
choice  she  otherwise  would  not  have  (Interview  with  Bessie,  Dessie,  9  June  2014).  
  
Bessie’s  reasoning  is  widely  accepted  by  a  number  of  repatriation  programs,  such  as  
the   former   UK   program   called   “Choices”   (http://www.choices-­‐‑avr.org.uk),   which  
emphasized  that  funds  assist  refugees  to  start  businesses  or  receive  job  training  after  
return,   a   choice   they   otherwise   would   not   have.      In   Pakistan,   the   UN   similarly  
emphasized  that  refugees  should  have  the  choice  of  returning  to  Afghanistan  with  
funds,   rather   than  no  assistance  at  all,  even   if   they  faced   insecurity  after  returning  
(Davin  et  al  2009).  The  UN  made  similar  claims  when  helping  Burundian  refugees  
return  from  Tanzania  (Haver  et  al  ibid).  When  Solomon  returned,  he  similarly  was  
the   choice   of   returning  with  money,   even   if   he   ultimately  was   unsuccessful   after  
returning.    
  
Though   money   may   provide   an   extra   choice,   it   is   not   clear   there   is   value   in  
providing   a   choice   that   fails   to   increase   welfare,   and   which   severely   constrains  
options  later  on.  Once  Bessie  and  Solomon  returned,  they  no  longer  had  the  option  
of  again  moving  to  seek  employment,  or  to  access  reliable  food  and  shelter.  If  NGOs  
and   governments   will   be   unable   or   unwilling   to   send  money   to   those   who   have  
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already  returned,  and   those  who  return  will   later  need  money   to   reach  safety  and  
necessities,  then  funds  simply  add  an  additional  unacceptable  option,  and  one  that  
may  constrain  options   later  on.     Given   the   finite  budget   that  NGOs  have,   it   seems  
preferable   to   invest   in   options   that   enhance   welfare   and   increase   future   options,  
such  as  in  healthcare  or  education  for  refugees  remaining  in  the  host  country.    
  
NGOs  may  respond  to  this  claim  with  a  third  and  final  argument.  In  many  cases  it  
would  be  unhelpful   to  provide  healthcare  and  education   to   refugees   remaining   in  
the   host   countries,   as   they   will   be   deported   regardless.   Encouraging   refugees   to  
return   is   preferable   to   refugees   facing   a   violent   and   traumatic   deportation.   If  
Solomon  were  to  stay  in  detention,  immigration  officials  would  likely  one  day  open  
his  cell  door,  force  him  and  his  daughter  into  a  van,  drive  them  to  the  airport,  and  
handcuff  both  to  their  seats  as  the  plane  lifted  off.  Deportations  throughout  Europe  
involve  similar  force,  and  include  psychiatrists  forcibly  sedating  refugees  on  flights  
and  officials  physically  sitting  on  refugees  until   they  cannot  breath,  move,  or   fight  
back   (Fekete,   2005).   If   deportation   is   traumatic,   it   is   better   to   return   without  
resistance,  and  money  encourages  such  non-­‐‑resistance.  
  
Though  payments  may  encourage  a   safer   return  compared   to   forced  deportations,  
there  is  a  reason  NGOs  should  still  avoid  payments  in  a  range  of  cases.  In  general,  
NGOs  should  avoid  being  complicit   in  coercive  policies,  and  causally  contributing  
to  these  policies  (Lepora  and  Goodin,  2013;  Rubenstein,  2014).  When  humanitarian  
organizations   provide   payments   for   repatriation,   this   may   be   complicit   in   unjust  
refugee  policies  by  encouraging  the  government  expand  its  use  of  detention.  
  
A  number  of  scholars  have  published  findings  suggesting  such  a  causal   impact.   In  
1994   and   1995   UNHCR   began   facilitating   repatriation   of   the   Rohingyan   refugees  
from   Bangladesh   to   Burma,   providing   limited   funds   to   the  most   vulnerable,   and  
various   forms   of   aid   upon   return.   Soon   after,   the   Bangladeshi   government   began  
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requiring  that  more  refugees  live  in  enclosed  camps  to  pressure  return,  seeing  that  
their   return   was   sponsored   by   UNHCR   (Barnett   and   Finnemore   ibid,   p.   106).   In  
Israel   in   2012,   one   Israeli   Knesset   report   states   that   NGOs   had   established   that  
refugees   were   willing   to   repatriate   when   offered   funds   to   do   so,   and   so   the  
government   should   endorse   an   even  more   aggressive   return  policy   for   those  who  
had   yet   to   return   (Protocol   84).   Encouraging   return   from   detention   may   also  
increase   the   government’s   capacity   to   detain   more   refugees.   When   the   NGO   in  
Israel  encouraged  Solomon  to  return  from  detention,  the  government  quickly  filled  
his  cell  with  a  new  asylum  seeker,  who  had  previously  not  been  detained,  keeping  
in  line  with  the  government’s  policy  of  filling  the  detention  centre  to  its  maximum  
capacity   (The  Migrant   2014).   If   we   assume   that   some   of   these   new   detainees   are  
refugees,   an   assumption   held   by   UNHCR   (2015),   then   repatriation   funds   may  
increase  the  rate  of  refugee  detention  at  a  given  time.      
  
Ashutosha  and  Mountz   (2011)  raise  a  similar  argument,   though  do  not  specify   the  
specific   role   of   payments.   They   argue   that   the   International   Organization   of  
Migration   (IOM),   which   helps   asylum   seekers   return   from   detention,   wrongly  
legitimates  government  immigration  policies,  making  the  policies  seem  less  coercive  
than  they  are  (Ashutosha  and  Mountz,  2011).  Payments  may  further  have  this  effect.  
If  refugees  quietly  accept  cash  in  an  envelope,  the  public  may  believe  the  return  is  
voluntary   and   safe,   when   it   is   not.   Even   a   judge   will   unlikely   see   evidence   of  
physically   forced   returns.   This   may   undermine   advocacy   efforts,   further   fuelling  
detention  policies.  In  contrast,   if  refugees  stay  in  detention  they  send  a  message  to  
the   public   that   they   are   afraid   to   return   and,   if   they   are   eventually   deported,   the  
public  and  judicial  system  will  be  aware  that  they  were  forced  to  leave.    
  
Refugee   activists   in   Israel   have   made   a   similar   argument.   These   activists   would  
organize   hunger   strikes   in   detention,   long   marches   through   the   desert,   and  
incessant  media   campaigns  documenting  precisely  why   they   left   Ethiopia,   Sudan,  
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Eritrea,  and  South  Sudan.  (Lior,  2013).  They  encouraged  other  refugees  to  lobby  the  
Israeli  government,  but  repatriation  funds  discouraged  such  lobbying,  encouraging  
return,   rather   than   resistance.      This   phenomenon  was   especially   clear   in   2012.     A  
month  before  the  planned  deportation  of  South  Sudanese  nationals,  protests  against  
the  deportation  were  widespread.  Soon  after,   representatives   from  an  NGO  began  
offering   money   to   return,   explaining   to   refugees   that   deportation   was   likely  
(Interview  with   Bol,   Juba,   21   December,   2013;   Interview  with  Nathaniel,   Juba,   14  
December  2013;  Interview  with  Vanessa,  Juba,  25  December  2013).  The  campaign  to  
prevent   deportation   slowly   died   down,   as  more   returned,   and   fewer   remained   in  
detention.   As   the   campaign   died   down,   the   detention   rates   further   increased,  
encouraging   even  more   to   return.  As  more   returned,  more  detention   cells   became  
available,  allowing  the  government  to  detain  additional  refugees.    
  
More   evidence   is   needed   to   fully   establish   whether   funds   causally   contribute   to  
coercive  policies   in   the  way  described.   If   they  do,   then  NGOs   should  discontinue  
such   payments.   Not   only   will   denying   payments   help   mitigate   coercion,   but   it  
needn’t  force  refugees  to  stay  in  detention  or  face  a  traumatic  deportation.  Refugees  
can   still   avoid   such   deportation   by   acquiescing   to   deportation   without   money.  
Immigration   authorities   informed   Solomon   that   his   flight   would   be   paid   for   by  
immigration   authorities,   and   he   could   board   the   flight  without   handcuffs,   even   if  
this  also  meant  returning  without  money.  NGOs,   in  paying  refugees   to  return,  are  
not   increasing   refugees’   access   to  acceptable  options;   they  are  merely  encouraging  
acquiescence  to  a  silent  return,  reinforcing  the  involuntary  nature  of  returns.    
  
The  above  reasoning  suggests  it  would  be  ethical  for  NGOs  to  provide  payments  if  
at  least  one  of  two  conditions  are  met.  The  first  condition  is  that  individuals  will  not  
be  at   risk   if   they  returned,  because  conditions  have   improved   in   their  countries  of  
origin,  or  because  the  amount  of  money  provided  is  so  substantial  as   to  ensure  an  
acceptable  level  of  welfare  after  return.  Such  a  return  would  be  voluntary  because,  
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as  noted  in  the  previous  section,  choices  can  be  voluntary  if  they  involve  at  least  one  
acceptable  option.    
  
The   second   condition   where   payments   are   permissible   is   when   refugees,   though  
returning  to  possibly  unsafe  conditions,  will  continue  to  lack  rights  if  they  stay,  and  
their  returning  does  not  causally  contribute  to  the  coercion  of  others.  This  might  be  
the   case   if   individuals  will   almost   certainly  be  deported   regardless.   In   such   cases,  
NGOs  do  not  causally  contribute  to  coercion,  because  refugees’  detention  cells  will  
be  free  regardless  of  whether  they  accept  money,  leading  the  government  to  detain  a  
new   refugee   either   way.   Payment   may   also   fail   to   contribute   to   coercion   if  
governments  are  unlikely  to  change  their  policies  regardless  of  advocacy  efforts,  or  
if  advocacy  efforts  are  not  focused  on  the  population  paid  to  leave.  Such  a  scenario  
is  common  when  migrants  do  not   fit   the  definition  of  “refugee”   in   the   legal  sense,  
such  that  the  government  and  judiciary  are  unlikely  to  ever  provide  them  rights.  In  
such  scenario,  money  has  value  in  that  it  provides  individuals  an  extra  choice,  even  
if  this  choice  still  entails  an  insufficiently  low  level  of  welfare.    
  
In  the  case  of  Solomon,  it  may  be  that  the  second  condition  was  met,  and  so  paying  
him  was  legitimate.  If  his  deportation  was  likely,  then  his  place  in  detention  would  
be  freed  regardless  of  whether  he  returned  on  his  own  or  through  deportation.  It  is  
also  unlikely  that  his  being  forcibly  deported  would  strengthen  advocacy  efforts,  as  
advocacy   efforts  were   focused  almost   entirely  on   those  who   fled  persecution,   and  
Solomon   had   fled   poverty.   In   the   case   of   Bessie,   we   might   reach   the   same  
conclusion;   she   lacked   refugee   status,   nor  was   she   intending   to   apply   for   refugee  
status,  and  so  would  likely  be  deported  in  the  future.  Providing  her  money  to  start  a  
chicken  farm  was  better  than  providing  nothing  at  all.    
  
In  the  case  of  Tigisti  and  her  family,  in  contrast,  neither  of  the  above  conditions  was  
met  when  they  returned  to  Eritrea,  and  so  payments  were  not  ethically  permitted.    
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The  money   they   received  was   insufficient   to   ensure   their   protection   upon   return,  
and  their  returning  causally  contributed  to  the  undermining  of  their  protection.  This  
is   because   they  would  unlikely  have  been  deported,   as   there  was   a   strong   chance  
she   and   her   family   would   eventually   secure   refugee   status,   either   in   Israel   or  
another   safe  country.  The  UN   in   Israel  already  recognized   them  as   likely   refugees  
and   the  High  Court   of   Justice  had   called   for   the   end  of   indefinite  detention  of   all  
Eritreans.   Though   there   was   a   possibility   that   Tigisti   and   her   family   would  
eventually   be   violently   deported,   NGOs   should   not   have   encouraged   them   to  
acquiesce  to  returning,  given  that  there  was  a  significant  chance  they  would  obtain  
protection   if   they   stayed.  And  even   if   they  ultimately  would  be  deported,   at   least  
the   deportation   would   be   public,   unlike   quietly   returning   with   money.   A   public  
deportation   can   serve   as   evidence   in   a   court   petition   against   the   government'ʹs  
actions,  contributing  to  greater  refugee  rights  in  the  future.  If  there  are  greater  rights  
in   the   future,   refugees’   choices   to   return  will   be  more   voluntary   in   the   future,   as  
they  will  have  the  alternative  of  living  in  the  host  country  with  a  sufficient  level  of  
welfare.  
  
Some  may  find  the  implications  of  my  argument  disturbing.  By  denying  payments  
to  refugees,  NGOs  would  be  creating  a  scenario  where  some  refugees  will  not  agree  
to  return  and  may  ultimately   face  deportation,  experiencing  police  brutality   in   the  
process.   To   deny   them   payments   would   seem   to   be   using   refugees   as   a   means,  
discouraging   them   from   returning,   possibly   leading   them   to   face   a   much   more  
traumatic   return,   in  order   to  encourage  a  more   just   long-­‐‑term  policy.  Encouraging  
refugees   to  repatriate,   in  contrast,  addresses   the  welfare  of   refugees  as   individuals  
with  their  own  needs,  rather  than  objects  for  a  larger  scheme.  
  
Though  it  is  true  that  refusing  to  give  money  is  for  a  larger  scheme,  it  is  not  true  that  
refusing  such  money  is  wrongly  using  refugees.  For,  we  generally  do  not  wrongly  
use   people  when   denying   them   an   option,   unless  we   have   a   duty   to   provide   the  
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option.  If  I  refuse  to  buy  someone  cigarettes,  out  of  concern  for  others  who  would  be  
harmed  from  second  hand  smoking,  I  am  not  using  the  person  as  a  means,  because  I  
have   no   duty   to   buy   these   cigarettes.   Similarly,   if   NGOs   have   no   duty   to   pay  
refugees   to   return,   they   are   not   using   refugees   when   refusing   to   provide   them  
money   to   leave.   It   is   true   that   refugees  may   prefer   to   have  money   than   not,   but  
denial   of   funds   is   preferable   to   help   mitigate   coercive   policies,   and   improving  
conditions  for  refugees.    
  
3.  Conclusion    
Immigration  control  involves  not  just  force,  but  incentives,  and  one  major  incentive  
for  refugees  is  the  money  they  receive  when  agreeing  to  repatriate.  When  refugees  
voluntarily  accept  payments   to   repatriate   to  unsafe  countries,   they  are  accepting  a  
choice  that  later  places  their  lives  at  risk.  It  is  wrong  for  the  state  to  pay  individuals  
to   later   risk   their   lives.   States   should   only   provide   funds   to   repatriate   if   they   can  
ensure   a   safe   return,   by   either   paying   refugees   sufficient   funds   to   obtain   security  
after   repatriating,   or   providing   refugees   the   option   of   again   living   in   the   host  
country.  The  latter  policy  might  involve  instituting  special  re-­‐‑admission  agreements,  
where  refugees  can  return   to   the  host  country  with   the  same   legal  status   they  had  
prior  to  repatriating.    
  
In   cases  where   refugees   are   detained   or   destitute,   NGOs   should   avoid   providing  
payments  that  contribute  to  the  government’s  coercive  policies,  either  by  freeing  up  
a   cell   in   detention,   undermining   refugee   resistance   to   government   detention  
policies.  NGOs   should   limit   their   activities   to  helping   those  who  will   be  deported  
regardless,  or  those  who  will  not  be  at  risk  if  they  return,  because  conditions  are  safe  
in  their  home  countries,  or  because  they  are  returning  with  sufficient  funds  to  access  
security.    
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To  ensure  that  repatriation  does  not  lead  to  long-­‐‑term  destitution  and  persecution,  
states  and  NGOs  must  also  be  aware  of  the  risks  of  returning.  As  such,  they  should  
conduct   post-­‐‑return   research.   If   the   vast  majority   of   returnees   are   living   in   safety  
and   security,   it   may   be   justified   for   states   to   provide   funds   to   encourage   return  
without   the   corresponding   promise   of   allowing   later   re-­‐‑entrance.      It  may   also   be  
justified  for  NGOs  to  provide  payments  to  return,  even  if  they  potentially  contribute  
to  government  coercion.    
  
Though  I  believe  the  above  would  make  payments  significantly  more  ethical,  there  
remain   serious   dilemmas.   It   is   not   clear   if   payments   are   always   ethical   when  
provided   to   migrants   returning   to   safe   countries.   If   only   some   ethnic   groups   or  
nationalities   are   offered   money   to   leave,   such   offers   may   be   wrongfully  
discriminatory.   We   may   also   feel   uncomfortable   with   officials   approaching   our  
friends,   classmates,   and   colleagues,   telling   them   they   can   have   cash   if   they   leave,  
after  having  established  themselves  in  our  neighbourhoods,  schools,  and  businesses.  
Payments   do   not   become   ethically   unproblematic   when   return   is   safe.   They   are  
simply   especially   problematic   when   return   is   unsafe.   NGOs   and   governments  
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